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ABSTRACT 
Formal methods provide support for validation and verifica-
tion of interactive systems by means of complete and un-
ambiguous description of the envisioned system. They can 
also be used (for instance in the requirements/needs identi-
fication phase) to define precisely what the system should 
do and how it should meet user needs. If the entire devel-
opment process in supported by formal methods (for in-
stance as required by DO 178C [7] and its supplement 333 
[8]) then classical formal method engineers would argue 
that the resulting software is defect free. However, events 
that are beyond the envelope of the specification may occur 
and trigger unexpected behaviors from the formally speci-
fied system resulting in failures. Sources of such failures 
can be permanent or transient hardware failures, due to 
(when such systems are deployed in the high atmosphere 
e.g. aircrafts or spacecrafts) natural faults triggered by al-
pha-particles from radioactive contaminants in the chips or 
neutron from cosmic radiation. This position paper propos-
es a complementary view to formal approaches first by 
presenting an overview of causes of unexpected events on 
the system side as well as on the human side and then by 
discussing approaches that could provide support for taking
into account system faults and human errors at design time. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The overall dependability of an interactive system is the 
one of its weakest component and there are many compo-
nents in such systems ranging from the operator processing 
information and physically exploiting the hardware (input 
and output devices), interaction techniques, to the interac-
tive application and possibly the underlying non interactive 
system being controlled. 
Building reliable interactive systems is a cumbersome task 
due to their very specific nature. The behavior of these 
reactive systems is event-driven. As these events are trig-
gered by human operators, these systems have to react to 
unexpected events. On the output side, information (such as 
the current state of the system) has to be presented to the 
operator in such a way that it can be perceived and inter-
preted correctly. Lastly, interactive systems require address-
ing together hardware and software aspects (e.g. input and 
output devices together with their device drivers).  
In the dependable computing domain, empirical studies 
have demonstrated (e.g. [20]) that software failures may 
occur even though the development of the system has been 
extremely rigorous. One of the many sources of such fail-
ures is called natural faults [1] triggered by alpha-particles 
from radioactive contaminants in the chips or neutron from 
cosmic radiation. A higher probability of occurrence of 
faults [31] concerns systems deployed in the high atmos-
phere (e.g. aircrafts) or in space (e.g. manned spacecraft 
[13]). Such natural faults demonstrate the need to go be-
yond classical fault avoidance at development time (usually 
brought by formal description techniques and properties 
verification) and to identify all the threats that can impair 
interactive systems. 
WHY FORMAL METHODS AND ZERO DEFECT 
APPROACHES ARE NOT ENOUGH  
To be able to ensure that the system will behave properly 
whatever happens, a system designer has to consider all the 
issues that can impair the functioning of that system. In the 
perspective of identifying all of them, in the domain of 
dependable computing, Avizienis et al [1] have defined a 
typology of faults. This typology leads to the identification 
of 31 elementary classes of faults. Figure 1 presents a sim-
plified view of this typology and makes explicit the two 
main categories of faults (top level of the figure): i) the 
ones occuring at development time (including bad designs, 
programming errors, …) and ii) the one occuring at opera-
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tion times (right-hand side of the figure including user error 
such as slips, lapses and mistakes as defined in [25]).
We propose to organize the leaves of the typology in five 
different groups as each of them brings a special problem 
(issue) to be addressed: 
· Development software faults (issue 1): software faults 
introduced by a human during the system development.  
· Malicious faults (issue 2): faults introduced by human 
with the deliberate objective of damaging the system 
(e.g. causing service denial or crash of the system).  
· Development hardware faults (issue 3): natural (e.g. 
caused by a natural phenomenon without human in-
volvement) and human-made faults affecting the hard-
ware during its development.  
· Operational natural faults (issue 4): faults caused by a 
natural phenomenon without human participation, af-
fecting the hardware and occurring during the service 
of the system. As they affect hardware, they are likely 
to damage software as well.  
· Operational human-errors (issue 5): faults resulting from 
human action during the use of the system. These faults 
are particularly of interest for interactive system and 
the next subsection describe them in detail. 
We consider that malicious faults are beyond the scope of 
this position paper and will thus not be further discussed. 
However, it might be interesting within the workshop to 
address this aspect that is more and more relevant with the 
open, collaborative interactive systems.  
Considering system faults 
In the domain of fault-tolerant systems, empirical studies 
have demonstrated (e.g. [20]) that software crashes may 
occur even though the development of the system has been 
extremely rigorous. One of the many sources of such crash-
es is called natural faults [1] triggered by alpha-particles 
from radioactive contaminants in the chips or neutron from 
cosmic radiation. A higher probability of occurrence of 
faults [31] concerns systems deployed in the high atmos-
phere (e.g. aircrafts) or in space (e.g. manned spacecraft 
[13]). Furthermore the evolution of modern IC components 
may lead in the next future to a higher probability of physi-
cal faults in operation. Although the recommendation for 
avionics systems is 100 FITs over 25 years lifetime, the 
current Deep Sub-Micron (DSP) technology may lead to a 
failure rate up to 1000 FITs, only during 5 years operational 
life time [28]. This is major worry in the avionics industry 
since this tendency has two bad sided effects, i) the reduc-
tion of the life time of the systems and ii) the increase of the 
failure rate due to hardware faults. Such natural faults 
demonstrate the need to go beyond classical fault avoidance 
at development time (usually brought by formal description 
techniques and properties verification) and to identify all 
the threats that can impair interactive systems. 
Considering human errors 
Several contributions in the human factors domain deal 
with studying internal human processes that may lead to 
actions that can be perceived as erroneous from an external 
view point. In the 1970s, Norman, Rasmussen and Reason 
have proposed theoretical frameworks to analyze human 
error. Norman, proposed a predictive model for errors [21], 
where the concept of "slip" is highlighted and causes of 
error are rooted in improper activation of patterns of action. 
Figure 1. Typology of faults in computing systems (adapted from [1]) and associated issues for the resilience of these systems
Rasmussen proposes a model of human performance which 
distinguishes three levels: skills, rules and knowledge (SRK 
model) [25]. This model provides support for reasoning 
about possible human errors and has been used to classify 
error types. Reason [26] takes advantages of the contribu-
tions of Norman and Rasmussen, and distinguishes three 
main categories of errors: 
1. Skill-based errors are related to the skill level of perfor-
mance in SRK. These errors can be of one of the 2 fol-
lowing types: a) Slip, or routine error, which is defined 
as a mismatch between an intention and an action [21];
b) Lapse which is defined as a memory failure that pre-
vents from executing an intended action. 
2. Rule-based mistakes are related to the rule level of per-
formance in SRK and are defined as the application of an 
inappropriate rule or procedure. 
3. Knowledge-based errors are related to the knowledge 
level in SRK and are defined as an inappropriate usage 
of knowledge, or a lack of knowledge or corrupted 
knowledge preventing from correctly executing a task. 
At the same time, Reason proposed a model of human per-
formance called GEMS [26] (Generic Error Modelling 
System), which is also based on the SRK model and dedi-
cated to the representation of human error mechanisms. 
GEMS is a conceptual framework that embeds a detailed 
description of the potential causes for each error types 
above. These causes are related to various models of human 
performance. For example, a perceptual confusion error in 
GEMS is related to the perceptual processor of the Human 
Processor model [5].  
Causes of errors and their observation are different concepts 
that should be separated when analyzing user errors. To do 
so, Hollnagel [15] proposed a terminology based on 2 main 
concepts: phenotype and genotype. The phenotype of an 
error is defined as the erroneous action that can be ob-
served. The genotype of the error is defined as the charac-
teristics of the operator that may contribute to the occur-
rence of an erroneous action.  
These concepts and the classifications above provide sup-
port for reasoning about human errors and have been wide-
ly used to develop approaches to design and evaluate inter-
active systems [29]. As pointed out in [21] investigating the 
association between a phenotype and its potential genotypes 
is very difficult but is an important step in order to assess 
the error-proneness of an interactive system.
PROPOSALS FOR DEALING WITH SYSTEM FAILURES 
AND HUMAN ERRORS 
Although system failures and human errors can both occur 
at runtime and be strongly correlated, these two problems 
are handled separately when developing an interactive sys-
tem. 
Dealing with operational natural faults 
The issue of operational natural faults has hardly been stud-
ied in the field of human-computer interaction and just a 
few contributions are available about this topic. However, 
this issue has long been studied in the field of dependable 
computing systems. As the operational natural faults are 
unpredictable and unavoidable, the dedicated approach for 
dealing with them is fault-tolerance [1] that can be achieved 
through specialized fault-tolerant architectures, by adding 
redundancy or diversity using multiple versions of the same 
software or by fault mitigation: reducing the severity of 
faults using barriers or healing behaviors [19].
To deal with these faults, we proposed two approaches: 
· The reconfiguration of the interaction techniques or 
possibly the organization of display when required by 
the occurrence of hardware faults [18].
· The adaptation of fault-tolerant architecture for devel-
oping fault-tolerant widgets as proposed in [33] or for 
extending this approach to all the interactive compo-
nents of the interactive system (including for example 
the interaction techniques) as proposed in [10]. 
Dealing with human errors 
Many techniques have been proposed for identifying which 
human errors may occur in a particular context and what 
could be their consequences in this given context. 
· Several human reliability assessment techniques such 
as CREAM [12], HEART [35], and THERP [33] are 
based on task analysis. They provide support to assess 
the possibility of occurrence of human errors by struc-
turing the analysis around task descriptions. Beyond 
these commonalities, THERP technique also provides 
support for assessing the probability of occurrence of 
human errors. 
· Task models based techniques have also been proposed 
to identify, describe and analyze potential human errors 
and human tasks deviation such as in [29], [9] and [23]. 
Dealing with both operational natural faults and human 
errors 
Integrated approaches can be envisioned for taking into 
account both system faults and human errors. Such ap-
proaches can leverage existing techniques in the fields of: 
dependable computing, human reliability assessment and 
human computer interaction. As proposed in [16], a step-
wise and iterative process can be used to identify in a sys-
tematic way human error and system failures for an under-
development interactive systems. From this systematic 
identification, the construction of enriched task models 
(embedding potential human errors and system faults), can 
provide support for analyzing their impact and proposing 
changes for modifying the system.
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE FROM THE ATM WORLD 
The typology of faults introduced in Figure 1 can be easily 
applied to any application providing support to understand-
ing how the approach followed for the development of a 
system is addressing the various faults.  
In the case of AMAN application proposed for the work-
shop, the various faults can lead to failures in the manage-
ment of the aircrafts by the air traffic controllers. For in-
stance, as detailed in [17], we have analysed 3 types of 
failures leading to 3 automation degradation scenarios: 
advisories from AMAN being not available anymore, advi-
sories being frozen for a while then starting again and advi-
sories provided being delayed.  
If a rigorous development process is followed and formal 
methods are used (as proposed in DO178-C [7]) one could 
expect that such failures would not occur. However, natural 
faults could easily produce such undesired behaviours. Sim-
ilarly human errors such as not perceiving the advisories or 
interpreting them incorrectly could also end up with similar 
malfunction (but this time at organizational level only as 
the system is supposed to function correctly).  
CONCLUSION  
This position paper argues that formal methods are good 
candidates for dealing with development faults. However, 
this position paper has also presented a typology of faults 
that identify other sources of failures that development 
faults: natural faults and human errors.  
In order to cover all these faults and to prevent related fail-
ures to occur we argued that multiple combined approaches 
(including formal methods) should be applied. For instance, 
it is interesting to note that detection and recovering mech-
anisms for natural faults could be described using formal 
methods in order to guarantee that their behaviour will be 
conformant with the expected one (as presented in [34]).  
We have not addressed issues related to malicious faults 
that could however be discussed during the workshop.  
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